Energy is the silent precondition for almost every other function. Without electricity, gas and fuel, communications, transport, healthcare, water, food production and public order only work to a limited extent. In the event of collective defence , energy therefore becomes the central critical infrastructure – and at the same time a vulnerable target. Contrary to common assumptions, protecting and operating the energy supply is primarily a civilian responsibility: that of operators, grid companies, utilities and the competent authorities. In the event of collective defence, military forces remain tied up primarily with military tasks and cannot take over the protection of critical energy infrastructure across the board.
What changes in the event of collective defence
In the event of collective defence, the situation shifts not only because of higher demand, but because of simultaneous disruptions:
- Priorities and competition for resources: energy is needed at the same time for civilian basic services, critical services and military deployment and staying power . This increases conflicting objectives and requires clear prioritisation.
- Hybrid attacks and sabotage: energy infrastructure is an attractive target because even small disruptions can trigger large cascades. Cyberattacks, manipulation, sabotage or disinformation can impair operations, restart and public order.
- Cascade effects: a power failure hits other systems first: mobile networks, IT, pumps, cooling, logistics, payment systems. A local outage thus quickly becomes a situation affecting society as a whole.
Where the vulnerability lies
1) Dependencies rather than individual facilities
The problem is not the individual facility but the network: generation, transmission, distribution, control systems, maintenance, spare parts, external service providers. Resilience is decided at interfaces and hubs, not just at the power station.
2) IT and control systems as an operational risk
Energy supply depends on digitally controlled systems. Disruptions or attacks on IT, telecontrol technology and communication channels can distort the situation picture or slow down processes. For operators, cyber resilience is therefore not an add-on, but part of core operations.
3) Staff and operational capability
In the event of collective defence, skilled staff may be unavailable or tied up elsewhere, for example due to increased workload, disrupted mobility, family circumstances or additional tasks in crisis structures. Resilience therefore needs redundancy not only in technology but also in staffing.
What resilience means in practice in the energy sector
Resilience is not the illusion of preventing outages. Resilience is the ability to keep supplying under disruption, to stabilise quickly and to restart in a controlled way. What matters most:
- Emergency operation and restart: clear plans, exercises, backup communications, prioritised restoration sequences.
- Redundancy and island operation: where possible, alternative feeds, backup systems, mobile components and robust logistics for critical spare parts.
- Coordinated prioritisation: interfaces between operators, local authorities, emergency services, healthcare and other critical infrastructure sectors.
- Crisis communication: clear, regular communication to the public and local authorities so that behaviour remains predictable and rumours do not make the situation worse.
What this means for local authorities, businesses and households
Local authorities need realistic assumptions: which outages are conceivable, what consequences arise for water, care, transport, schools and administration, and which local points of contact still work without digital infrastructure.
Businesses should see energy not just as a cost factor but as a risk axis: backup power, process prioritisation, “must run” functions, IT resilience, supply chains for fuel and spare parts.
Households stabilise the overall system through personal preparedness: anyone who can secure basic supplies for a few days relieves emergency services, hospitals and local structures in the first phase of a crisis.
Preparedness and emergency supply laws
Resilience regulation for critical infrastructure (physical & cyber)
- The KRITIS Umbrella Act addresses the physical resilience of energy-related facilities and makes requirements for protection and restart more binding.
- NIS2 is relevant because energy supply cannot remain stable without robust IT/OT security; minimum standards and reporting processes reduce the risk of outages under hybrid threats.
Energy: Energy Security Act (EnSiG)
Creates the legal basis for the state to intervene at short notice and stabilise security of supply in the event of a serious threat to or disruption of the energy supply. In particular, it makes it possible to manage scarce energy in exceptional situations and to set priorities so that vital areas – such as critical infrastructure, healthcare and core state functions – remain able to act.
Water: Water Supply Security Act (WasSiG)
Water and energy are mutually dependent: water supply needs electricity for pumps, treatment and control, while energy generation and industrial processes need water for cooling and operation. Water shortages or disruptions in the water sector can directly affect energy supply and grid stability, so prioritisation has to be thought through across sectors.
Transport and logistics: Transport Security Act (VerkSiG)
Energy supply needs logistics: fuel, spare parts, maintenance and repairs all depend on transport and access. In a crisis, transport prioritisation directly affects the restoration and stabilisation of energy infrastructure.
