State and administration

What changes in the event of collective defence

1) Continuous stress instead of a single incident

Collective defence does not mean a single event, but a longer phase of increased strain. Situation monitoring, protective measures, securing supplies, policing, disaster control and civil-military coordination all run in parallel. Decisions have to be taken faster, often with incomplete information.

2) Attacks on processes, not just buildings

Hybrid attacks target administrative capacity: cyberattacks, data manipulation, IT outages, disinformation, threats against staff, sabotage of infrastructure. Even small disruptions can have a big impact if they block central processes (e.g. ability to pay, approvals, situation pictures, alerting).

3) Prioritisation and emergency mode

In a crisis, administration must switch from normal operations to core tasks. This requires priorities defined in advance, clear responsibilities and the ability to remain legally sound and able to decide even with reduced resources.

Core tasks of administration in total defence

Maintaining state functions

Total defence requires central state functions to keep running: government, administration, public safety, emergency communication, critical approval and supply-securing processes.

Situation picture and coordination

Crisis team, situation centre, interfaces with the federal states, local authorities, emergency services, critical infrastructure operators and – depending on the situation – the Bundeswehr. What matters is less “more information” than a robust, shared understanding of the situation and clear reporting channels.

Crisis communication

Transparent, consistent communication prevents rumours, reduces panic and increases the ability to cooperate. Administration is responsible for putting warnings into context, explaining what people should do and making accessible points of contact visible – especially when digital channels fail.

Supporting supplies and the armed forces

In total defence, civilian bodies share responsibility for securing supplies (e.g. accommodation, distribution, prioritisation) and for defined support services arising from alliance obligations. This requires prepared procedures and contacts, not ad hoc improvisation.

Typical weak points

1) Dependence on IT

Many core processes depend on digital specialist applications, networks and communication services. When IT fails, there are often no paper-based backups, fallback procedures or staff who master these routines.

2) Diffusion of responsibility

Federalism distributes responsibilities – sensible in everyday life, demanding in a time-critical situation. Unclear roles between the federal government, federal states, local authorities and subordinate agencies slow down decisions, especially when prioritisation is needed.

3) Staff shortages

Crisis operations tie up staff for long periods. At the same time, employees may be unavailable or assigned to other tasks. Resilience therefore needs deputising arrangements, clear delegation of decisions and realistic shift models.

Responsibilities and decision-making: who leads when

1) Normal peacetime

• Internal security, hazard prevention, disaster control: generally the federal states and local authorities (police, fire services, disaster control authorities).
• Civil protection (protecting the population in a state of defence): the federal government in cooperation with the federal states; operationally this includes the BBK (warning, information, preparedness advice, supporting the federal states with warning and information).
• Bundeswehr: in peacetime, as a rule, no general responsibility for protection tasks at home. Deployment at home only in the exceptional cases provided for by the constitution (e.g. administrative assistance).

2) Administrative assistance and disasters: the Bundeswehr can support, but does not automatically take charge

• Article 35 of the Basic Law governs legal and administrative assistance between authorities and – in special situations – the deployment of the Bundeswehr in support (e.g. natural disaster/particularly serious accident). Important: this is support on request, not a permanent “takeover” of civilian responsibilities.

3) External emergency: state of tension, state of defence and related mechanisms

This is where the emergency provisions of the Basic Law apply, above all in Art. 80a (state of tension/approval case/alliance case) and Art. 115a et seq. (state of defence).

• State of tension (Art. 80a Basic Law): allows certain emergency provisions to be activated; the conditions and procedure are set out in Art. 80a.
• State of defence (Art. 115a et seq. Basic Law): is determined by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat ; this shifts powers in order to safeguard the functioning of the state.

Power of command over the Bundeswehr:

• in a state of defence it passes automatically to the Federal Chancellor (Art. 115b Basic Law).

• 4) Federal government vs. federal states in civil protection: the basic principle

For total defence, a robust rule of thumb applies:

• Federal government: civil protection + nationwide framework
• Federal states: disaster control + police hazard prevention. This is precisely the division of responsibilities that so strongly shapes questions of communication and implementation in practice.

Preparedness and emergency supply laws

For an external emergency (e.g. approval case, alliance case, state of tension or state of defence), there is a set of federal laws enabling the state to requisition services, prioritise resources and secure basic supplies. Their main purpose is to organise the supply of the population and the functioning of defence in a legally sound way – but they do not replace an easily understandable civilian logic of action.

1) Resilience regulation for critical infrastructure (physical & cyber)

• KRITIS Umbrella Act – establishes state risk analyses and resilience requirements for critical services and structures nationwide governance of physical critical infrastructure protection (responsibilities, supervision, implementation).
• EU NIS2 Directive – strengthens digital capacity to act by setting binding minimum standards for risk management, reporting channels and recovery processes in the organisations concerned – a prerequisite for leadership and crisis coordination.

2) Staff and workforce

• Labour Security Act (ASG) – enables measures to secure work performance for defence purposes (including protection of the civilian population).

3) Transport and logistics

• Transport Security Act (VerkSiG) – legal framework for securing transport services for defence purposes.
• It governs how transport services can be requisitioned when needed.

4) Economy and industrial capacity

• Economic Security Act (WiSiG) – enables state measures to secure the supply of goods and services for defence purposes.

5) Water

• Water Supply Security Act (WasSiG) – legal basis for securing water services for defence purposes.

6) Energy

• Energy Security Act (EnSiG) – preparedness law for cases where vital energy needs cannot be met through market mechanisms; enables, among other things, interventions to stabilise supply.

7) Civil protection and disaster relief

• Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG) – governs key federal responsibilities for civil protection and disaster relief.

8) Postal services and telecommunications

• Postal Act (PostG) – defines the legal framework of the postal market in which services such as reliable delivery routes for documents and official notices are provided.
• Telecommunications Act (TKG) – provides the regulatory basis on which telecoms services act as the backbone of communication.

9) Food:

• Food Security and Preparedness Act (ESVG) – prerequisite for legally sound state intervention in supply processes when a supply crisis is imminent or has occurred. This enables prioritisation and coordination when market mechanisms and normal supply chains are no longer sufficient.