In the event of collective defence or a state of defence , water becomes one of society’s most sensitive lifelines. Drinking water, wastewater, firefighting water and process water keep not only households running, but also hospitals, food supply, energy supply, industry, hygiene and public order. Water is therefore part of critical infrastructure – and at the same time an area where small disruptions quickly trigger large cascades.
The key point: securing the water supply is primarily a civilian responsibility. Operators, local authorities, water associations and the competent authorities have the operational duty to maintain supply, fix disruptions and inform the public. Military forces can support, but they do not replace municipal systems.
What changes in the event of collective defence
1) Multiple pressures instead of a single incident
In the event of collective defence , outages rarely occur in isolation. Water depends on electricity, IT, staff, chemicals, spare parts and logistics. If one of these fails, the whole system comes under pressure.
2) Hybrid threats and sabotage as a realistic stressor
Waterworks, pumping stations, control centres, measuring systems and transport chains are potential targets for hybrid attacks. Cyberattacks on control systems, data manipulation, sabotage or disinformation can delay operation and recovery and undermine trust.
3) Prioritisation and competition for resources
Water is needed at the same time by the population, hospitals, fire services, industry and possibly additional users. Without a prepared prioritisation logic, an emergency leads to conflict between actors, not just a bottleneck in the network.
Where the vulnerability lies
Dependence on electricity
Abstraction, treatment and distribution depend on pumps and control systems. Backup power is therefore not a “bonus” but a basic requirement – as is the ability to prioritise sensibly during long outages.
Digitalisation and control systems
Water supply today is highly digital. That increases efficiency, but also the attack surface. Resilience therefore means: clear offline procedures, segmentation, emergency operation, practised restart plans.
Chemicals and consumables
Treatment requires certain substances and materials. Supply chain disruptions therefore have a direct effect on quality and throughput.
Staff and availability
In the event of collective defence, staff may be unavailable or tied up elsewhere. At the same time, the need for shift capability, repair teams and communication rises. Resilience therefore needs not only technical redundancy, but also staff backups and clear delegation of decisions.
What resilient water supply needs in practice
1) Emergency operation and restart
- clear step-by-step plans for supply during partial and total outages
- defined priorities: hospitals, care, critical services, the population
- practised procedures for bringing facilities and networks back into operation
2) Redundancy and alternative supply
- backup power and fuel logistics for pumping stations and treatment
- mobile solutions (e.g. tankers, emergency wells, distribution points) where available
- spare parts and repair capability for critical components
3) Crisis communication and trust
Water is highly sensitive because health and hygiene are directly affected. Communication must therefore be fast, clear and consistent: what has failed, what applies to tap water, where are distribution points, how long is it likely to take, what should households do.
What this means for local authorities, businesses and households
Local authorities and operators
need robust emergency plans, practised crisis teams, communication chains and interfaces with energy, health, fire services, police and utilities. Water is not a stand-alone system. It is part of a network.
Businesses
must know their process water dependencies, plan emergency shutdowns and define “must run” functions for outages. Especially in food production, health, chemicals, logistics and critical infrastructure services, water determines operational capability.
Households
stabilise the overall system through personal preparedness. Anyone who stores drinking water for a few days reduces the pressure on emergency distribution, hospitals and local structures. In an outage, what counts is not only technology but also social organisation: neighbourly help, support for vulnerable people, clear arrangements.
Preparedness and emergency supply laws
Water: Water Supply Security Act (WasSiG)
The Water Supply Security Act (WasSiG) creates the legal framework for managing water supply and water services in a supply crisis so that drinking water, hygiene, public safety and core state functions are maintained. It is thus a cornerstone of civil preparedness: when water becomes scarce or systems are disrupted, the WasSiG enables legally sound prioritisation and coordination so that supply does not have to be improvised.
Energy: Energy Security Act (EnSiG)
The Energy Security Act (EnSiG) is relevant to water supply because water infrastructure does not work without energy: pumps, treatment, pressure maintenance and control systems depend on electricity and fuel. In a severe disruption, the EnSiG can provide the legal framework for stabilising or prioritising energy so that water supply, wastewater and hygiene continue to function as basic services.
Food: Food Security and Preparedness Act (ESVG)
Water is a basic prerequisite for food: processing, hygiene and agriculture depend on it. The ESVG is relevant because supply crises usually cut across sectors and food security practically does not work without stable water availability.
Transport and logistics: Transport Security Act (VerkSiG)
Water crises create transport needs (emergency water supply, materials, repairs) and require accessible routes. The VerkSiG is relevant because it provides the framework for prioritising and carrying out water-related transport in a shortage.
Resilience regulation for critical infrastructure (physical & cyber)
- The KRITIS Umbrella Act strengthens the physical resilience of water infrastructure and establishes operator obligations for emergency operation and restart.
- NIS2 is relevant because water operations depend heavily on control and automation technology; cyberattacks can disrupt supply directly.
