Civilian population

Civil society in a state of defence: responsibility, preparation, participation

In modern security scenarios, the population is not only a target of hybrid threats but also helps to shape collective security. OPLAN DEU explicitly addresses this role. It relies on joint action by the state, the economy and society – even in extreme situations.
Sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation or failures of electricity and communications have their primary impact in the civilian sphere. Those who are prepared reduce vulnerability, stabilise their surroundings and relieve the emergency services. Total defence therefore begins in everyday life.

Self-protection and collective security

Protecting the civilian population does not begin with state measures – it begins with each individual.
Basic preparedness is practical resilience. It strengthens your own staying power and creates room for manoeuvre when help is not immediately available. This relieves the emergency services in a crisis so they can concentrate on where they are needed. In concrete terms, basic preparedness means:

• Stocking water, food and medicines for at least 10 days
• Alternative sources of light and heat in case of power cuts
• First-aid supplies, hygiene items, a battery radio, a cash reserve
• Secured documents and emergency contacts, family and neighbourhood arrangements
• Means of communication beyond the internet (notices, local meeting points, neighbourhood networks, radio)

Building resilience skills among the population is not a technocratic goal but a democratic necessity: those who know what to do remain able to act – and protect not only themselves but the community as a whole.

Self-protection starts in everyday life: anyone who regularly tops up supplies, keeps important documents to hand and is connected with their neighbours builds robust self-reliance. Recommendations from the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) provide concrete checklists and guidance.

Volunteering and civil protection: the backbone in a crisis

In Germany, crises are managed not only by public authorities but to a large extent by volunteers. Volunteer fire brigades, the THW, rescue services, relief organisations, medical services and many local structures carry much of the operational burden in an emergency: they secure, rescue, supply, clear, set up emergency infrastructure, organise care and support local authorities.

In a conflict in particular, pressure and complexity increase: emergency services have to deal with outages, shortages and possible disinformation at the same time, while the need for assistance rises. This means: Volunteering is not a side note but a strategic factor in resilience. Without enough staff, training, exercises and public recognition, civil protection remains stretched to the limit.

Those who get involved strengthen not only their own community but the functioning of society as a whole. This can happen in established organisations, but also through low-threshold contributions: helping neighbours, supporting older people, helping at local emergency meeting points, donations, logistical help or the willingness to take on responsibility pragmatically in an emergency.

OPLAN DEU also assumes that such basic preparations exist across the board – as the basis for a resilient society.

Trust in institutions – and vice versa

The population’s resilience is closely linked to trust in state action. This trust does not arise in an emergency, but must be built beforehand – through:

• transparent and comprehensible communication,
• clear responsibilities,
• and preparation, such as regular exercises involving the public.

To ensure that information works in a crisis too, the state relies on a wide range of redundant warning tools: Cell Broadcast, sirens, warning apps (such as NINA or KATWARN), radio and loudspeaker announcements. But here too: knowledge protects. Only those who know and understand these systems can interpret warnings correctly and respond to them.

Information and psychological resilience

A failure of digital infrastructure (electricity, mobile networks, internet) combined with targeted disinformation can quickly lead to overload, rumours, inability to act or social paralysis.

That is why we need:

• a considered way of dealing with uncertainty and fear
• the ability to take responsibility and remain able to act in stressful situations
• stable social networks – offline, local and based on solidarity
• training in stress management and crisis communication, e.g. in schools, workplaces and administrations

Total defence is not solely the task of the Bundeswehr, the police or politicians. Civilian resilience is not a by-product of military planning but its prerequisite: only a prepared, informed and involved population can enable sustainable responses in a crisis and effectively complement state action. OPLAN DEU provides the military framework for this. But awareness, preparedness and responsibility arise in each individual’s everyday life..

Preparedness and emergency supply laws

Energy: Energy Security Act (EnSiG)
Energy outages have an immediate impact on everyday life, supplies, communication and safety. The EnSiG provides the state framework for restoring security of supply in a severe disruption and stabilising critical areas first.

Water: Water Supply Security Act (WasSiG)
The WasSiG protects the public water supply, but does not replace personal preparedness in the early phase of a disruption (e.g. storing drinking water). It is relevant because water has an immediate practical impact on daily life, and orderly measures safeguard trust, hygiene and stability.

Food: Food Security and Preparedness Act (ESVG)
The ESVG protects basic supplies but does not replace personal preparedness: in the early phase of a crisis, individual preparation remains crucial to take pressure off the system. It is relevant because it supports the state’s ability to maintain supply in an organised way even during shortages.

Postal Act (PostG) and Telecommunications Act (TKG)

• PostG: Postal and parcel services can support practical basic supplies in tense situations (e.g. delivery of important goods and documents). The PostG governs the conditions under which these services are provided.
• TKG: Civil protection (warnings, information, reachability) works largely via telecommunications. The TKG therefore directly concerns the infrastructure through which people receive information and organise help.

Transport and logistics: Transport Security Act (VerkSiG)
In a crisis, traffic management can directly affect everyday life, commuting, supplies and evacuation. The VerkSiG provides the framework for prioritising mobility and transport so that basic supplies and public safety are maintained.

Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG): what it can – and cannot – do

The Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG) sets out the framework for federal civil protection and federal disaster relief. It thus defines the role the federal government plays in protecting the population – especially in a state of defence or tension (civil protection) and in major incidents where the federal states need support (disaster relief).

What the ZSKG can do:

• Specify federal responsibility for civil protection: The act provides the basis for the federal government to organise measures to protect the population in a state of defence in legal terms (e.g. strategic framework, structures, participation).
• Enable federal disaster relief: It creates the legal framework under which the federal government can support the federal states when their resources are insufficient (while respecting federal responsibilities).
• Strengthen coordination and support: It sets the framework for federal resources (e.g. via the BBK) to be coordinated, deployed and linked with state structures in major incidents.
• Support a uniform basic logic in civil protection: It helps to ensure that key terms, tasks and interfaces in civil protection remain clearly defined in law – as a prerequisite for cooperation, exercises and crisis communication.

It can improve coordination and framework conditions – but it does not replace implementation by the federal states, detailed operational planning or practical capacity on the ground.